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Abstract  
Our memories contain a wealth of social information – including details of past interactions, 
facts about others, and others’ identities. Yet, human memory is imperfect, and we often find 
ourselves unable to recall such information in social interactions. Conversely, people 
routinely find themselves on the receiving end of others’ memory failures; that is, people 
sometimes find themselves forgotten. Despite the apparent pervasiveness of such 
experiences, modern science possesses no explanatory framework for understanding the 
psychological impact of being forgotten in part or in whole. Here, we propose that evidence 
of memory in social interactions is a powerful signal of the subjective importance attached to 
an object of memory and that interpretation of such signals has important consequences for 
interpersonal relationships. We further proposed that attributional explanations for forgetting 
and that the closeness of the relationship between the people involved in forgetting might 
moderate the impact of being forgotten. We tested this framework in four studies examining 
the experience of being forgotten in daily life (Study 1), in experimentally controlled 
firsthand encounters (Study 2), and in third party perceptions of forgetting (Studies 3 and 4). 
Results converged to support our proposed framework as well as the moderating role of 
attribution. Surprisingly, we found no evidence supporting the moderating role of initial 
relationships closeness. These results advance a systematic model of an understudied but 
important phenomenon and suggest rich and varied avenues of additional exploration.     
Keywords: Memory; forgetting; person memory; communication; social relationships 
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On Being Forgotten: Memory and Forgetting Serve as Signals of Interpersonal 
Importance   
Who and what we remember or forget has been a major theme in psychological 
research since its beginnings. Strikingly, however, modern science can say very little about 
the experience of being remembered or forgotten – about the impact of having one’s identity, 
presence, characteristics, words, or actions accurately recounted as opposed to 
misremembered or forgotten entirely by another person. The current paper attempts to 
illuminate the experience of being forgotten or remembered.  
First, we provide a basic description of the experience of being forgotten in daily life 
(i.e., its frequency, content, involved people, and subjective character). Next, we present a 
relational model of being forgotten or remembered that treats evidence of memory as a 
powerful relational signal during social interaction. In this model, we propose that indications 
of memory convey subjective importance in social interactions, which in turn can support or 
undermine social connections. We also explore two potential moderators of this process: 
attributional explanations for being forgotten and the type of relationship involved. Finally, 
we empirically evaluate an alternative non-competing model of the intrapersonal 
consequences of being forgotten which proposes that being forgotten can be understood 
through parallels with ostracism.  
A Relational Model 
Forgetting information about others is a frequent experience (Young, Hay, & Ellis, 
1985). People routinely forget others’ names (Cohen & Burke, 1993), faces (Bruce & Young, 
1986), and actions (Loftus, 1996). But what about the experience of being forgotten?  
Certainly, anecdotal evidence and popular culture provide examples that suggest 
being forgotten has interpersonal consequences. Drama following a forgotten birthday, for 
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example, featured in well-known films and books such as Sixteen Candles and Harry Potter 
and the Chamber of Secrets.  
The available scientific evidence also suggests that forgetting has social ramifications. 
For example, listeners are more likely to forget information themselves after a speaker has 
forgotten that information (Stone, Coman, Brown, Koppel, & Hirst, 2012). Such findings 
imply interpersonal significance through social influences on memory.  
More directly, several pieces of evidence suggest that memory is part of the core 
fabric of social interaction. By providing common ground and subject matter for interaction, 
social bonding may be a primary function of autobiographical memory (Alea & Bluck, 2007; 
Bluck, 2003). Having one’s name forgotten by other people threatens existential needs for 
meaning (King & Geise, 2011). Clinical impairments in memory from conditions like 
Alzheimer’s disease and developmental prosopagnosia impose significant social burdens 
(Pruchno & Resch, 1989; Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008). 
These findings make clear that memory failure is socially relevant and has significant social 
consequences. They do not, however, provide a systematic description or framework with 
which to understand the experience of being forgotten.  
In the work reported here, we pursue a threefold approach to providing a systematic 
understanding of the experience of being forgotten. First, we describe the experience in a 
naturalistic context. We provide a basic understanding of what the phenomenon looks like in 
everyday life by asking how often people are forgotten, who forgets, what gets forgotten, and 
how it feels to be forgotten. Second, we propose and test a relational model of the experience 
of being forgotten or remembered. Third, we explore potential parallels between being 
forgotten and ostracism.  
Our relational model suggests that being remembered or forgotten presents a special 
theory of mind problem with particularly important relational implications (Flavell, 1999; 
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Nichols & Stich, 2003). Evidence of memory informs people about how they are regarded by 
the person who remembers or forgets them and this information, in turn, affects interpersonal 
relationships. Figure 1 presents our theoretical model of the psychological impact of being 
remembered or forgotten. 
In our model, we conceptualize remembering and forgetting broadly, encompassing 
memory for any type of social information. This includes a past interaction or event, factual 
information about a person, or even having met a person at all.  
Our model predicts that people interpret evidence of memory as signals of importance 
in social communication (path A, Figure 1). This prediction follows naturally from theory of 
mind and people’s drive to seek causal explanations for others’ behaviors (Baron-Cohen, 
1997; Kelley, 1973). Specifically, people are aware that they devote greater resources to 
remembering more important information (Castel et al., 2011) and assume that information 
they remember is more important than information they forget (Castel, Rhodes, McCabe, 
Soderstrom, & Loaiza, 2012). We suggest that people apply a similar logic to their 
interpretations of others’ communications of memory.  
In turn, we predict that learning one’s identity, presence, characteristics, words, or 
actions are important or unimportant to another person will respectively support or undermine 
closeness in interpersonal relationships (path B, Figure 1). This prediction follows from the 
integral importance of feeling valued to successful interpersonal relationships (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995). Indeed, close relationships in which people feel devalued often experience 
strife or end altogether (Murray & Holmes, 2011).  
Further, although we expect our core model to be broadly applicable across different 
circumstances and different relationships, we investigate two factors that might alter the 
impact of being forgotten or remembered. First, attributional explanations for remembering 
or forgetting have the potential to alter the link between memory and subjective importance 
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(path C, Figure 1). Our earlier hypotheses imply that people attribute being forgotten to 
relational factors, specifically, to how important or unimportant the object of memory was to 
the forgetter. However, relational attributions are not the only possible explanation for being 
forgotten. Forgetting could also be explained by external circumstances (e.g., distraction) or 
by stable dispositions on the part of the person forgetting (e.g., absentmindedness; Jones & 
Davis, 1965; Kelly, 1973). If forgetting is attributed to external circumstances or to stable 
dispositional factors instead of relational factors, then the object of forgetting might appear 
more important to the forgetter than if such explanations were missing.  
The second potential moderator we investigate is initial relationship closeness. People 
want to feel valued by strangers and friends alike (Hartgerink et al., 2015). At the same time, 
however, it seems plausible that signals of value from a friend or another close partner might 
be more impactful than signals of value from a stranger (path D, Figure 1). Indeed, people’s 
expectations of emotional intimacy and relational positivity are higher in closer relationships 
than in less close relationships (Fuhrman, Flannagan, & Matamoros, 2009).  
The Ostracism Hypothesis 
In addition to its relational effects, the experience of being forgotten might plausibly 
also impact intrapersonal outcomes in the same way as ostracism and social exclusion. 
Ostracism and exclusion threaten not only relational needs but also intrapersonal needs like 
self-esteem, perceived control, and meaning in life (Williams, 2007). Moreover, people are 
extremely sensitive to cues of exclusion and ostracism (Williams, 2007). Even exclusion by a 
pre-programmed entity (i.e., a computer) or by hated outgroup members is aversive 
(Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). 
 In fact, the only existing work directly examining the experience of being forgotten 
(that we are aware of) focuses on lack of importance as a threat to existential meaning (King 
& Geise, 2011). In this work, participants whose name was forgotten reported decreased 
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feelings of meaning in life. Interestingly, however, having one’s name forgotten did not 
measurably influence state self-esteem. Given the apparent parallels between being forgotten 
and ostracism, the human sensitivity to exclusion, and King and Geise’s (2011) findings after 
an apparently trivial instance of being forgotten, we predicted that, in addition to its relational 
effects, being forgotten would also impact the same non-relational outcomes as ostracism, 
namely self-esteem, perceived control, and felt meaning in life.  
Overview 
We investigated the experience of being forgotten in four studies. Study 1 used a daily 
diary methodology to gather (a) descriptive information about the frequency and subjective 
experience of being forgotten in daily life and (b) quantitative information bearing on all 
hypotheses. Study 2 examined our core model (paths A and B, Figure 1) experimentally by 
constructing firsthand experiences of being remembered or forgotten in newly-formed 
relationships. Studies 3 and 4 examined third-party reactions to depictions of forgetting and 
memory in order to experimentally examine the proposed moderators of our core model 
(paths C and D, Figure 1). As a whole, the current studies provide a clear picture of the 
experience of being forgotten in daily life. Forgetting another person, even in small ways, is a 
powerful and surprisingly consistent signal of relational value that impacts relational 
functioning and need satisfaction in interpersonal relationships. 
Because of the number, variety, and complexity of the studies reported here, our 
descriptions of materials and results are somewhat abridged. The omitted elements are 
available in online supplementary materials (INSERT FINAL URL).  
Study 1 
 Study 1 used a daily diary design to gain insight into people’s experiences of being 
forgotten in their daily social interactions. This study had five goals. First, the study was 
designed to collect descriptive data about the frequency and subjective nature of people’s 
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experiences of being forgotten. Second, we tested our core relational model, which specifies 
that being forgotten leads to decreased perceived importance (path A, Figure 1) and 
relationship closeness (path B, Figure 1). Third, we examined whether the impact of being 
forgotten on perceived importance differed depending on people’s attributions for memory 
failure (path C, Figure 1). Fourth, we examined whether the impact of being forgotten on 
interpersonal closeness differed across different relationships (path D, Figure 1). Fifth and 
finally, we tested whether being forgotten predicted (dis)satisfaction of intrapersonal needs 
more broadly.  
 Each day over a two-week period, participants described every experience in which 
they were forgotten by others. Participants completed open-ended and closed-ended measures 
of their feelings during these experiences, including their general feelings and their feelings 
towards the person who forgot them. Participants also rated their satisfaction of interpersonal 
and intrapersonal needs each day.  
Method  
Participants 
Fifty-six students (14 men, 42 women) from a university in the United Kingdom 
participated in the study during the first three weeks of the first semester of the academic 
year. Participants were 21 years old on average (SD = 3.72). Most participants (95%) were 
not originally from the city in which the university was located. Participants were recruited 
by advertising at a volunteer opportunities fair for incoming students, posting flyers, and 
advertising the study on social media. Participants who completed all parts of the study 
received £50 GBP (approximately $70 USD).  
Procedure  
Following initial instruction, participants were emailed a weblink to an online daily 
diary each night for 14 days. This diary asked participants to provide open-ended descriptions 
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of every incident in which they were forgotten by another person that day. Participants were 
then provided space to describe each incident, their feelings about each incident, and how the 
incident ended. Participants next answered several closed-ended questions about the incident. 
We assessed (a) the category that best represented participants’ relationship with the person 
who forgot them (e.g., friend, family member, etc.), (b) how important participants felt to the 
person who forgot them, (c) how close participants felt to the person who forgot them, and 
(d) how close participants perceived the person who forgot them to feel. The final three item 
types were assessed on seven point scales anchored at 1 - much less than before - and 7 - 
much more than before. The scale midpoint of 4 was labeled no change. Participants 
completed these measures for each incident they described.  
Regardless of whether participants reported an incident of being forgotten that day or 
not, participants were asked to rate their general feelings of belonging, importance, self-
esteem, personal control, meaningful existence, and positive and negative mood that day. 
These items were assessed on 7-point scales anchored at 1 - not at all and 7 - especially. 
Participants also completed a control measure of the overall quality of their social 
interactions that day. All of these items were presented in random order each day to limit 
routine responding.  
Results  
Analytic Strategy   
We first present descriptive information about the frequency, character, and subjective 
nature of participants’ experiences of being forgotten during the diary period. The coding 
schemes involved were generated using a combined deductive and inductive approach. We 
created categories based on both the hypotheses and on common themes in participants’ 
responses. Four independent coders, who were blind to the study’s hypotheses, each coded 
half of participants’ open-ended responses, such that two coders rated each response. 
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Agreement between coders was adequate across the questions (Cohen’s κ = .72). 
Discrepancies between coders were resolved through discussion.    
We next present tests of the hypotheses derived from our relational model of being 
forgotten in sequence. We first assessed whether being forgotten was associated with 
inferences of importance and changes in relational closeness, as well as with overall daily 
feelings of importance and belonging (paths A and B, Figure 1). Next, we assessed whether 
these relationships depended on explanations for forgetting and the relationship between the 
person forgotten and the forgetter (Paths C and D, Figure 1). Finally, we examined parallels 
between being forgotten and ostracism by testing the influence of being forgotten on 
participants’ non-relational intrapersonal needs each day.  
In both descriptive analysis and hypothesis tests, we often compared participants’ 
responses on days when they were forgotten and on days when they were not forgotten. In 
these analyses, we regressed participants’ daily reports onto a variable reflecting the number 
of times participants were forgotten each day in multilevel analyses. To model the non-
independence of participants’ data across days, we specified diary day as a repeated measure 
and allowed the intercept to randomly vary across participants. These analyses controlled for 
participants’ level of the dependent measure the previous day in order to control for variation 
across days. We also reasoned that participants may report being forgotten more when they 
socialized more with others on a given day. We thus isolated the effects of being forgotten 
from the overall quality of participants’ social lives that day by controlling for this latter 
variable in our models.  
Broad Description 
The descriptive data suggested that being forgotten by others was a fairly common 
experience. In total, participants reported 461 incidents of being forgotten by others across 
the two-week diary period. On average, participants reported 8.23 incidents (SD = 3.88, 
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range: 1-19) of being forgotten during the diary period. Most of the incidents ended with the 
participant reminding the other person of the forgotten information (n = 245) or ended 
without the person ever remembering the forgotten information (n = 180). Only occasionally, 
the other person remembered the information on their own (n = 28). Most of the time (90%), 
the other person did not apologize for forgetting participants.  
What gets forgotten? Based on the participants’ descriptions of the incidents, we 
identified six different experiences of being forgotten. Figure 2 presents the percentage of 
incidents in each category. The most frequent type of incident (n = 223) involved the other 
person forgetting participants’ personal details, including their name, subject in university, 
and year in school (e.g., “The manager of the hotel where I am working forgot my name”). 
Participants also frequently reported (n = 122) that others forgot aspects of a past interaction 
or conversation with participants (e.g., “A close friend started talking about a party she had 
gone to a few months ago, and she forgot that I was there as well.”). Occasionally, others did 
not recognize, acknowledge, or remember meeting the participant (n = 44, e.g., “My student 
did not recognize me right away, so he passed by me”) or forgot a promise they had made to 
the participant (n = 40, e.g., “My friend was supposed to meet me at the library today so we 
could work through course work and then a test together, but they forgot and didn't show 
up.”).Some participants also reported that others had forgotten to include them in an activity 
or event (n = 17; e.g., “My friends organised a night out, and forgot to ask me.”). Finally, 
some participants reported that others confused them for someone else (n = 15, e.g., “My 
flatmate called me by our other flatmate's name.”). The most common experiences of being 
forgotten thus involved the forgetting of personal details or past interactions.  
Who forgets? Figure 3 presents the frequency of being forgotten by different types of 
relationship partners. Participants were most likely to be forgotten by people they had just 
met (n = 100), followed by classmates or coworkers (n = 86), friends (n = 85), acquaintances 
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(n = 75) and roommates (n = 66). Less frequently, participants were forgotten by family 
members (n = 31) and romantic partners (n = 15). Forgetting thus occurred across a broad 
variety of relationships, with forgetting by family members and romantic partners occurring 
notably less often.  
The relationship involved in particular incidents of forgetting also appeared to 
influence the type of information forgotten (Figure 4). Forgetting of personal details and 
failures of recognition happened more often in less close relationships whereas forgetting of 
past interactions and promises happened more often in closer relationships.  
How does it feel to be forgotten?  
Open-ended feelings. We coded participants’ open-ended reports on their feelings 
during the event into four categories – positive reactions, negative reactions, neutral 
reactions, and surprised reactions. Negative (M = 5.05, SE = .60) and neutral reactions (M = 
3.96, SE = .34) were more common than surprised (M = 1.62, SE = .23) or positive reactions 
(M = 0.96, SE = .18), all ps < .001, Cohen’s d > 1.01, but did not differ in frequency from one 
another, t(55) = 1.65, p = .625, Cohen’s d = 0.30, all comparisons Bonferroni adjusted. 
Overall, these data characterize the experience of being forgotten as neutral at best but as or 
more often negative.  
Daily mood. Being forgotten on a given day significantly predicted daily mood 
(Figure 5). Participants felt more negative mood, b = .20, SE = .09, t(430.23) = 2.23, p = .026, 
and less positive mood, b = -.14, SE = .07, t(403.29) = -2.04, p = .042, on days they had been 
forgotten more. Thus, being forgotten was associated with experiencing a more negative 
subjective state in general. 
Hypothesis Testing 
 Inferred importance (path A, Figure 1). We expected that being forgotten by 
another person would lead to feeling less important to that person. In the present data set, two 
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outcome variables were relevant to this hypothesis – participants’ within-incident ratings of 
their subjective feelings of importance to the person who forgot them, and participants’ daily 
ratings of felt importance to others in general. We expected that (a) participants would report 
decreased subjective importance after specific incidents of being forgotten and (b) that 
participants would feel less important to other people in general on days where they were 
forgotten than on days when they were not forgotten.  
 We first tested whether participants’ ratings of how important they felt to the person 
who forgot them differed significantly from the midpoint of the scale (i.e., 4 = same as 
before) using one-sample t-tests. Consistent with our prediction, participants reported a small 
but reliable decrease in their feelings of importance to the person who forgot them, M = 3.73, 
SE = .04, t(422) = -6.93, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.34.   
We next tested whether being forgotten on a given day also significantly predicted felt 
importance to other people (Figure 5). As expected, participants who reported being forgotten 
more on a given day felt less important to other people that day, b = -.30, SE = .07, t(437.95) 
= -4.48, p < .001. Our predictions about inferred importance were thus well supported in 
these data.  
 Relationship closeness (path B, Figure 1). We proposed that the negative relational 
implications of feeling unimportant after being forgotten would reduce closeness to the 
forgetter. In the present data, the relevant outcome variables are participants’ within-incident 
ratings of their closeness to the person who forgot them, participants’ within-incident ratings 
of how close they believed the other person felt to them, and participants’ daily ratings of felt 
belonging. We expected (a) that participants would report reduced closeness after specific 
incidents of being forgotten, (b) that participants would believe that the person who forgot 
them felt less close to the participant, and (c) that participants would feel less general 
belonging on days when they were forgotten than on days when they were not forgotten.  
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Participants’ rating of their own closeness conformed to our prediction. Participants 
reported a small but reliable decrease in their feelings of closeness to the person who forgot 
them, M = 3.76, SE = .04, t(422) = -6.18, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.30. Participants’ day-to-day 
feelings of belonging also supported our prediction. Participants who reported being forgotten 
on a given day felt less belonging in general that day, b = -.24, SE = .06, t(432.67) = -4.22, p 
< .001 (Figure 5). Surprisingly, however, participants’ feelings about the other person’s 
closeness to them did not significantly differ from the midpoint, M = 3.96, SE = .03, t(422) = 
-1.39, p = .166, Cohen’s d = 0.06.   
Our predictions about relationship closeness were thus supported by participants’ 
reports of their own closeness and by participants’ feelings of daily belongingness but not by 
participants’ beliefs about how close to participants the person who forgot them felt.  
 Moderation by attribution (path C, Figure 1). We expected that situational or 
dispositional (as opposed to relational) explanations for forgetting would eliminate the link 
between being forgotten and felt importance and thus also between being forgotten and felt 
closeness.  
From participants’ open-ended descriptions of each incident, we coded participants’ 
attributions for being forgotten into three categories: relational attributions, situational 
attributions, and dispositional attributions (Figure 6). The results were surprising in light of 
the previously reported impact of being forgotten on felt importance and relationship 
closeness. The large majority of attributions (77.42%) provided a non-relational excuse for 
forgetting. Of those, situational attributions (n = 286; e.g., “She already met too many people 
in the last couple of days”) were much more common than dispositional attributions (n = 73; 
e.g., “He generally seems not to listen to what people say and does not remember it later”). 
When participants made relational attributions (n = 91), they either inferred that they or the 
information were not important to the forgetter (n = 55; e.g., “I don't think she found 
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information about where I am from interesting or worth remembering”) or that the other 
person was not invested in or committed to the relationship with the participant (n = 36, e.g., 
“Maybe because I do not mean so much to this person”). The remaining participants did not 
know or did not say why they were forgotten (n = 11); these participants were not included in 
further analyses of attribution. Overall, participants thus usually explained being forgotten 
through non-relational attributions.  
 We next tested whether participants’ attributions predicted their feelings about their 
relationships with the person who forgot them. To do this, we created a set of dummy codes 
contrasting relational attributions to situational attributions and dispositional attributions, and 
then separately regressed felt importance, felt closeness, and perceived other closeness onto 
these codes in a multilevel model1. These analyses revealed that, as expected, participants felt 
significantly less important to the forgetter when they made relational attributions for being 
forgotten (M = 3.33, SE = .06) than when they made situational attributions (M = 3.89, SE = 
.04), b = .55, SE = .09, t(302.85) = 6.47, p < .001, 95% CI[.383, .717], or dispositional 
attributions (M = 3.74, SE = .04), b = .39, SE = .11, t(289.36) = 3.59, p < .001, 95% CI[.176, 
.604].  Similarly, participants also felt significantly less close to the forgetter when they made 
relational attributions (M = 3.38, SE = .06) than when they made either situational attributions 
(M = 3.93, SE = .04), b = .48, SE = .09, t(267.12) = 5.45, p < .001, 95% CI[.304, .648], or 
dispositional attributions (M = 3.70, SE = .04), b = .30, SE= .11, t(266.72) = 2.67, p = .008, 
95% CI[.079, .523]. Finally, participants also believed that the forgetter felt less close to them 
when participants made relational attributions (M = 3.75, SE = .05) than when they made 
situational attributions (M = 4.04, SE = .03), b = .31, SE = .07, t(236.38) = 4.41, p < .001, 
95% CI[.170, .445], or dispositional attributions (M = 3.99, SE = .03), b = .19, SE = .09, 
                                                        
1 Due to the structure of the diary data, these analyses only included the first incident of being forgotten that 
participants reported on any given day.  
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t(261.37) = 2.10, p = .037, 95% CI[.046, .389]. These results clearly support our prediction 
that non-relational explanations for being forgotten are associated with reduced feelings of 
unimportance and mitigated damage to relationship closeness caused by being forgotten.  
The finding that the large majority of incidents observed were explained away 
through non-relational attributions raised a new and important question about our previously 
reported findings, however. Was the negative impact of being forgotten driven solely by 
infrequent but impactful relational attributions for being forgotten? Or did being forgotten 
harm felt importance and closeness even after the mitigating influence of non-relational 
attributions?  
In order to evaluate these possibilities, we repeated our analysis of felt importance and 
felt closeness excluding all incidents of being forgotten that were explained through relational 
attributions. These analyses indicated that even when being forgotten was explained away 
through alternative situational or dispositional explanations, being forgotten still reduced felt 
importance (M = 3.84, SE = .04), t(333) = -4.38, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.24, and closeness 
(M = 3.86, SE = .04), t(334) = -3.54, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.19. Frequent non-relational 
attribution thus reduced the impact of being forgotten on felt importance and closeness but 
that reduction was not complete.  
Moderation by initial closeness (path D, Figure 1). We expected initial relationship 
closeness to moderate the impact of being forgotten on relationship closeness but not on felt 
importance. Specifically, we expected that the impact of memory on closeness would be 
larger in closer types of relationships. In order to assess this possibility, we tested whether the 
impact of being forgotten on felt importance, felt closeness, and perceived other closeness 
varied depending on the type of relationship participants had with the person who forgot 
them. Surprisingly, multilevel tests predicting each relational inference from the dummy code 
reflecting relationship type showed that relationship type did not significantly predict any of 
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these inferences (all ps > .22, 95% CI lower bounds ranged from -.23 to -.17, upper bounds 
ranged from .09 to .24). These results suggest that the type of relationship involved in an 
incident of being forgotten did not have drastic consequences for the impact of being 
forgotten. 
Parallels with ostracism. If the experience of being forgotten is qualitatively similar 
to the experience of being ostracized, then being forgotten would be expected to also threaten 
individuals’ intrapersonal needs, including the need for meaning in life, self-esteem, and 
control. To test this account, we regressed participants’ daily reports of each of these 
intrapersonal needs onto participants’ daily frequency of being forgotten, the previous day’s 
value of the dependent variable, and the overall quality of participants’ social interactions that 
day (Figure 5). Although, the magnitude of the effect of being forgotten on individual 
intrapersonal needs was quite consistent, the statistical significance of the individual 
measures varied (bs from .12 to .13, SEs from .06 to .08, ps from .026 to .147). Tellingly, an 
aggregate summary of all three intrapersonal needs was significantly affected by being 
forgotten (b = -.12, SE = .06, t(441.93) = -2.17, p = .030). In keeping with conceptual 
parallels to ostracism, being forgotten thus appears to have a relatively small but detectable 
effect on intrapersonal outcomes.   
The descriptive magnitude of the intrapersonal impact of being forgotten was a little 
less than half the size of the relational impact of being forgotten. In order to formally 
compare the magnitude of the relational and intrapersonal effects of being forgotten, we 
treated the aggregated intrapersonal effects of being forgotten and the aggregated relational 
effects of being forgotten as repeated measures representing different factor levels. We then 
adopted the recommendations of Judd, Kenny, and McClelland (2001) for assessing 
moderation in a repeated measures design using a regression framework. Specifically, we 
predicted the difference between the intrapersonal and relational effects of being forgotten 
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from the same multilevel model that we used to assess the impact of being forgotten on the 
individual outcomes. If being forgotten systematically predicted the difference between 
intrapersonal and relational outcomes, that would indicate that the difference in magnitude 
between relational and intrapersonal effects was statistically reliable (i.e., an interaction 
between being forgotten and the type of outcome measure). This analysis indicated that the 
descriptive difference between the relational and intrapersonal effects of being forgotten was 
statistically significant, b = -.16, SE = .06, t(386.82) = -2.73, p = .007. Thus, although being 
forgotten predicted both relational and intrapersonal outcomes, its impact was significantly 
larger on relational outcomes.  
Discussion  
Study 1 provides extremely rich information about the experience of being forgotten. 
Descriptively, our findings suggest that being forgotten is a broadly relevant experience. The 
experience was quite common, occurred across a variety of relationships, and most frequently 
involved the forgetting of personal details or past interactions. The subjective tone of being 
forgotten appears to be neutral at best but was equally or more often negative.  
Our core relational model was well supported (paths A and B, Figure 1). Being 
forgotten led to feeling less important to and less close to the forgetter. Additionally, people 
felt less important and like they belonged less in general on days when they were forgotten 
than on days when they were not forgotten.  
We also found clear evidence that the impact of being forgotten on felt importance 
and closeness is moderated by attributions for forgetting (path C, Figure 1). Situational and 
dispositional attributions reduced the negative impact of being forgotten relative to relational 
attributions. Importantly, however, this reduction was incomplete. Even after situational or 
dispositional attributions, being forgotten still negatively impacted felt importance and 
closeness. This latter finding is especially important as situational attributions for forgetting 
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were by far the most common explanation for being forgotten. It thus appears that people 
usually try to explain away being forgotten in apparently pro-social ways but are not fully 
successful in doing so.  
Contrary to expectations, we found no support for the hypothesis that being forgotten 
had a larger impact on felt closeness when the forgetter was initially closer to the participant 
(path D, Figure 1). Given the small magnitude of the base effects of being forgotten, 
however, conclusions about support (or lack thereof) for this hypothesis should be drawn 
with caution. Although large-scale qualification of our core model appears unlikely, 
relatively moderate attenuation or amplification might have gone undetected. Conclusions 
about this hypothesis are thus best reserved until it can be assessed in the context of a larger 
base effect of being forgotten (e.g., Study 4).  
We observed support for parallels between being forgotten and ostracism. Being 
forgotten had a significant negative impact on an aggregate measure of intrapersonal needs. 
This effect was about half the size of the impact of being forgotten on relational outcomes, 
however. This result suggests that the experience of being forgotten is multifaceted. Being 
forgotten most powerfully impacted relational outcomes but more subtly paralleled the 
intrapersonal impact of ostracism and rejection.   
Study 1 did have two meaningful shortcomings, however. First, Study 1 was 
ultimately correlational. Directional causal inferences must thus be interpreted with caution. 
Additionally, the design of Study 1 necessarily involved directing participants to be vigilant 
for experiences of being forgotten. Such vigilance might plausibly color otherwise innocuous 
encounters. That is, classifying particular experiences as instances of being forgotten might 
have encouraged participants to report increased negative outcomes after those experiences. 
Although Study 1 provided substantial ecologically valid insight into the experience of being 
forgotten and into the efficacy of our model in explaining that experience, we thus sought to 
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confirm our findings in experimental paradigms that made no explicit reference to 
remembering or forgetting.  
Study 2 
 Study 2 sought to confirm the core elements of our relational model in experimentally 
controlled, real, non-trivial interpersonal interactions. In this experiment, participants 
completed a relationship closeness induction with a confederate who subsequently either 
forgot or remembered information about the participant. We predicted that this manipulation 
would affect participants’ relational inferences towards the confederate, such that participants 
who were forgotten by their interaction partner would feel less important to their partner 
(path A, Figure 1) and would like their partner less (path B, Figure 1). As a second evaluation 
of parallels between being forgotten and ostracism, we also tested whether the memory 
manipulation affected participants’ meaning in life and state self-esteem.  
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight undergraduates and recent graduates from a university in the United 
Kingdom participated in Study 2. Four participants were removed from analyses because they 
expressed suspicion that the confederate was not another participant, leaving a sample of 44 
(33 women, 11 men). Participants were 21.48 years old on average (SD = 2.19). Participants 
who were enrolled in first or second year psychology courses received partial course credit in 
exchange for their participation. The remainder of participants volunteered without 
compensation.  
Procedure 
 The procedure involved several distinct parts. First, participants completed an 
interaction task with a confederate designed to induce closeness between new acquaintances. 
This task consisted of a series of increasingly intimate question-and-answer exchanges taken 
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from the Closeness-Generating Inventory (Aron, Melinat, Aron, Vallone, & Bator, 1997) and 
the Relationship Closeness Induction Task (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1999). 
Participants then completed a first set of dependent measures that included open-ended recall 
of their interaction with the confederate and ratings of how much the participant liked the 
confederate and the interaction. Participants were then, to their surprise, asked to swap the 
questionnaire page containing their open-ended recall and their liking ratings with the 
confederate. In return, participants received copies of typical and moderately positive ratings 
from the confederate along with the open-ended memory item. Depending on condition, the 
memory item indicated that the confederate had either remembered the interaction with the 
participant well or that the confederate had forgotten most of what the participant had said. 
Participants were then asked to complete the second set of dependent measures and were 
reassured that none of their new answers would be shared with the confederate. A wall-
mounted camera allowed the experimenter to track participants’ progress through the study 
and to deliver the measures and manipulations at appropriate times.  
In order to examine participants’ inferences of importance from evidence of memory 
(path A, Figure 1), we measured how important the participant thought their conversation had 
been to the confederate. In order to examine the relational impact of memory and forgetting 
(path B, Figure 1), we assessed how much the participant liked the confederate and how 
much overlap the confederate perceived between himself or herself and the confederate.  
Additionally, in order to test parallels between being forgotten and ostracism a second 
time, we assessed participants’ self-esteem and sense of meaning in life. We focused on these 
two variables at the expense of perceived control for two reasons. First, self-esteem can be 
measured with a state-based (as opposed to trait-based) scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). A 
state-based scale seemed most appropriate to the repeated measures design of Study 2. We 
are not aware of such a measure for perceived control. Second, although we are similarly not 
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aware of a state-based assessment for meaningfulness in life, previous research found that 
having one’s name forgotten impacted meaning in life specifically (King & Geise, 2011) and 
Study 1 revealed a small effect of being forgotten on meaning in life. We thus opted to 
measure meaning in life at a single time point. 
Results 
Changes caused by evidence of memory in participants’ perceived importance to, 
liking of, and self-other overlap with the confederate are graphed in Figure 7.  
Inferred importance (path A, Figure 1). We expected that participants would feel 
that their conversation was less important to the confederate after the confederate forgot that 
conversation than after the confederate remembered that conversation. A mixed-model 
factorial ANOVA with time (Time 1 or Time 2) as a within-subjects factor and memory 
condition (forgotten or remembered) as a between-subjects factor revealed the predicted 
interaction between time and memory condition, F(1, 42) = 18.90, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.31, 95% 
CI[.12, .46]. Participants’ feelings of importance decreased after the manipulation when they 
had been forgotten by the confederate, F(1, 42) = 29.63, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.41, 95% CI[.22, 
.55]. However, there was no change in participants’ feelings of importance when they had 
been remembered by the confederate, F(1, 42) = 0.84, p = .364, ηp2 = 0.02, 95% CI[< -.001, 
.13]. 
Felt closeness (path B, Figure 1). We expected that participants would like the 
confederate less and would include the confederate less in their sense of self after being 
forgotten than after being remembered. We assessed this hypothesis with a mixed factorial 
MANOVA on liking and inclusion of the confederate in the self with time as a within-
subjects factor and memory condition as a between-subjects factor. This MANOVA yielded 
the predicted condition by time interaction, F(1, 41) = 5.01, p = .030, ηp2 = 0.10, 95% CI[.01, 
.26].  
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Univariate examination of liking also revealed the predicted time by memory 
condition interaction, F(1, 42) = 6.45, p = .015, ηp2 = 0.13, 95% CI[.01, .29]. Participants 
liked the confederate significantly less after the confederate had forgotten information about 
them, F(1, 42) = 31.33, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.43, 95% CI[.23, .56] but did not change their liking 
of the confederate after being remembered, F(1, 42) = 2.80, p = .102, ηp2 = 0.06, 95% CI[< -
.001, .20].  
Inclusion of the confederate in the self showed the same pattern as that present in 
liking, but the condition by time interaction did not reach statistical significance, F(1, 41) = 
1.67, p = .20, ηp2 = .04, 95% CI[< -.001, .17]. Direct analysis of changes over time by 
condition indicated that being forgotten reduced inclusion of the confederate in the self, F(1, 
41) = 11.11, p = .002, ηp2 = 0.21, 95% CI[.05, .37], but being remembered did not change 
inclusion of the confederate in the self, F(1, 41) = 1.78, p = .187, ηp2 = 0.04, 95% CI[< -.001, 
.17]. 
We evaluated the proposition that changes in importance after being forgotten led to 
changes in liking after being forgotten by examining the indirect effects of memory condition 
on liking through inferred importance (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In 
order to include a repeated measures factor in the mediational analysis, comparisons across 
time were represented as difference scores (Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001). Consistent 
with the assumption that changes in subjective importance led to changes in liking, predicting 
liking from both memory condition and importance at the same time eliminated the 
relationship between memory condition and liking, b = 0.06, p = .795, while the relationship 
between importance and liking remained strong and significant, b = 0.53, p < .001. Formal 
assessment of the indirect effects estimated a coefficient of b = -0.69, with a 95% CI[-1.41, -
0.27] that did not contain zero. 
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Parallels with ostracism. Parallels between being forgotten and ostracism would 
predict that being forgotten would reduce state self-esteem and meaning in life. There were, 
however, no effects of memory condition on state self-esteem, F(1, 42) = 1.41, p = .242, ηp2 = 
.03, 95% CI[< -.001, .16] or on the search for meaning subscale of meaning in life, t(41) = -
0.82, p = .42. There was, however, a marginal effect of condition on sense of meaning in life. 
Consistent with King and Geise (2011), participants whose responses were remembered by 
the confederate (M = 5.31, SE = 0.17) tended to feel that their lives had more meaning than 
participants whose responses were forgotten by the confederate (M = 4.62, SE = 0.17), t(41) = 
1.93, p = .06, Cohen’s d = .60, 95% CI[-.03, 1.19].  
Discussion 
Consistent with our model, being forgotten decreased participants’ sense of 
importance and this experience in turn damaged the relevant interpersonal relationship. These 
effects are especially noteworthy given that the tone of the interactions was generally positive 
and that the confederate did not show any explicitly rejecting or negative behavior towards 
participants. Moreover, the memory manipulation was included among other more explicit 
evaluations of the participant. Despite this more explicit reference point, information about 
the confederate’s memory for the participant powerfully informed participants’ feelings 
towards the confederate. These findings thus support our core model (paths A and B, Figure 
1) by suggesting that others’ communications of memory can provide important information 
about one’s relational value that can, in turn, affect the character of social relationships. In 
contrast, being forgotten had very limited effects on intrapersonal outcomes. Being forgotten 
had no effect on state self-esteem and only a marginal effect on felt meaning in life. 
Consistent with the findings from Study 1, being forgotten seems to impact relational 
dynamics more powerfully than intrapersonal needs.  
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Critically, these results were obtained in an experimental design with no explicit 
references to forgetting. Concerns about causal order and about the influence of explicit 
attention to being forgotten from Study 1 thus do not apply to Study 2.  
Study 3 
 Study 3 returned to the role of attribution in the experience of being forgotten. We 
focused on confirming three key findings from Study 1: (a) that non-relational explanations 
for forgetting reduce the relational damage of forgetting, relative to relational explanations 
(path C, Figure 1), (b) that the majority of attributions for forgetting tend to be non-relational, 
and (c) that relational damage still occurs despite non-relational attributions.  
To these ends, we constructed a written scenario representative of the incidents 
observed in Study 1. Variations of this scenario compared forgetting paired with a relational 
explanation, forgetting paired with non-relational explanations, forgetting with no 
explanation, and remembering. We then assessed people’s attributions for memory or 
forgetting and their inferences about importance and relationship closeness after reading one 
of these variations. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 We recruited 388 participants from Prolific Academic, a crowd-sourcing website for 
conducting online research. Of these, 63 participants were dropped for the following reasons: 
not completing any measures (n = 8), duplicate submissions (n = 5), displaying unusually fast 
completion times (less than 2 minutes; n = 14) or unusually slow completion times (longer 
than 30 minutes, n = 6, and more than 3 SDs from the mean duration; n = 4), or failing an 
attention check (n = 26). The final sample consisted of 325 participants (174 men, 150 
women, 1 undisclosed). Participants were 30.43 years old on average (SD = 10.01). 
Participants were compensated with £0.5 GBP (approximately $0.6 USD).  
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This study used a one-way between-subjects design with five levels: dispositional 
attribution, situational attribution, relational attribution, no attribution information, and 
remembering.  
Materials and Procedure 
 We constructed a written scenario depicting an interaction between two friends in 
which one friend (the communicator) remembered or forgot a past interaction with another 
friend (the target). A backstory briefly described the friendship and the remembered or 
forgotten information. This backstory was further manipulated to create four different 
versions of the forgetting scenario. In the backstory for the forgetting scenarios, participants 
were sometimes presented with a dispositional explanation for forgetting (communicator is 
forgetful), a situational explanation for forgetting (communicator is busy), a relational 
explanation for forgetting (communicator is routinely inattentive to conversations with the 
target of memory but not with other people), or with no additional explanatory information. 
Chronic forgetfulness, being busy, and lack of attention to the target were selected as 
manipulations because they were respectively the most common dispositional, situational, 
and relational explanations for forgetting reported in Study 1, respectively.   
 After reading the vignette, participants rated the importance of the remembered or 
forgotten past interaction to the communicator, rated how close the target of memory was to 
the communicator, and then indicated whether they thought the past interaction was 
remembered or forgotten because of situational, dispositional, or relational reasons.  
Results 
Attributions 
In conditions where we manipulated attribution, we expected that participants’ 
attributions would predominately correspond to the attribution intended in the explanation for 
forgetting provided. In the remembering condition and in the forgetting condition with no 
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explanation, we expected attributions to mirror Study 1. That is, we expected remembering to 
be explained through relational attributions and we expected forgetting without an explicit 
explanation to be explained through situational or dispositional attributions. Participants’ 
attributions are graphed in Figure 8. 
As expected, the manipulation affected the kind of attributions participants made, 
χ2(8) = 87.14, p < .001, N = 325. The majority of participants presented with a dispositional 
explanation for forgetting made dispositional attributions (66%), with the remainder making 
situational (28%) or relational (6%) attributions. Similarly, the majority of participants 
presented with a situational explanation made situational attributions (68%), with the 
remainder making dispositional (21%) or relational (11%) attributions. Surprisingly, 
participants presented with a relational explanation most often made dispositional attributions 
(49%). However, participants in this condition did endorse substantially more relational 
attributions (32%) than did participants in the situational, dispositional, or no explanation 
conditions (11%, 6%, and 16%, respectively). 
As expected, in the no explanation condition, the majority of attributions observed 
were mitigating ones (84%), although dispositional attributions (50%) were more frequent 
than situational ones (34%). Surprisingly, relational attributions were even less frequent in 
this condition (16%) than in Study 1. In fact, the condition in which relational attributions 
were most common was the remembering condition. When the communicator remembered 
the past interaction, half of attributions were relational (49%), with the remaining half being 
evenly split between dispositional (26%) and situational (25%) attributions.  
There are three important elements of this result. First, the manipulation was effective 
in increasing the relative frequency of the intended attributions. Second, and consistent with 
Study 1, participants preferred mitigating attributions for forgetting when no explanation was 
provided but used relational and mitigating attributions equally for remembering. Third, and 
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most striking, participants were extremely hesitant to make relational attributions for 
forgetting. In the relational attribution condition participants were explicitly told that the 
forgetter did not pay attention to the target of memory but did pay attention to other people. 
Although this information prompted participants to make more relational attributions than in 
the other forgetting conditions, participants still more often attributed the memory failure to 
the forgetter’s disposition than to the relationship between the forgetter and the target. This 
pattern reinforces the dominance of non-relational explanations for forgetting observed in 
Study 1.  
Importance 
Based on our theoretical model (path C, Figure 1) and our findings from Study 1, we 
expected mitigating attributions to reduce the impact of being forgotten on inferred 
importance relative to relational attributions. Based on Study 1, we also expected that 
reduction to be incomplete. That is, we expected that forgetting would have a measurable but 
reduced impact on inferred importance after non-relational attributions. Because mitigating 
attributions were equally present in the three non-relational forgetting conditions, we did not 
expect to observe any differences between those conditions in inferred importance. 
Importance ratings for each condition are graphed in Figure 9. 
A one-way ANOVA with five levels revealed the expected effect of condition, F(4, 
320) = 28.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .26, 95% CI[.19, .32]. As expected and consistent with 
moderation by attribution (path C, Figure 1), relational explanations for forgetting led to 
significantly less inferred importance than did the non-relational explanations for forgetting, 
F(1, 320) = 11.19, p = .001, ηp2 = .04, 95% CI[.01, .07]. Also as expected and consistent with 
Study 1, participants inferred significantly more importance in the remembering condition 
than in the three non-relational forgetting conditions, F(1, 320) = 76.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .19, 
95% CI[.13, .25].  
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These results support the role of attribution in our theoretical model (path C, Figure 1) 
and replicate Study 1 in an experimental context. Mitigating explanations for forgetting 
reduced the impact of forgetting on inferred importance relative to relational explanations. As 
in Study 1, however, this reduction was incomplete. Forgetting a past interaction reduced the 
importance that participants believed the communicator attached to that interaction despite 
relationship-protecting attributions. 
Closeness 
We expected a pattern of relationship closeness parallel to that observed for 
importance. Closeness ratings for each condition are graphed in Figure 9. A one-way 
ANOVA again revealed an effect of condition, F(4, 320) = 8.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, 95% 
CI[.04, .14]. Post-hoc tests (SNK) indicated that inferred closeness in the remembering 
condition was significantly higher than in all other conditions. Additionally, although the 
relational attribution condition was descriptively lower than the non-relational attribution 
conditions, it did not differ from them significantly. This overall pattern was thus consistent 
with the results observed across importance and closeness in Study 1 and observed for 
importance in the present study, but the difference between the relational attribution and the 
non-relational attribution conditions did not reach conventional levels of significance.  
Discussion 
On balance, the results of Study 3 supported the role of attribution in our theoretical 
model (path C, Figure 1). Relational attributions for forgetting undermined importance and 
tended to undermine closeness. The weaker pattern in closeness was, perhaps, not surprising 
in light of two factors. First, closeness is causally downstream from importance. Downstream 
variables in causal chains are less strongly affected by the original antecedent than are more 
proximal variables. The effect of forgetting on closeness would thus be expected to be 
somewhat weaker than the effect of forgetting on importance (Kline, 2015). Second, although 
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the relational attribution condition contained more relational attributions than the other 
forgetting conditions, relational attributions were still not the most common response in that 
condition. The manipulation was thus effective but was probably not as strong as it would 
have been with a majority of relational attributions.  
This outcome does raise the question of whether a stronger manipulation of relational 
attributions might have been more appropriate. We chose to manipulate relational attributions 
indirectly through the amount of attention that the forgetter routinely paid to the target. A 
more direct approach could have instead explicitly characterized the forgetter’s investment in 
the target. In fact, we expect that such a manipulation would indeed yield more relational 
attributions. In our view, however, this approach would be tantamount to instructing 
participants on how to complete the dependent measures. We thus suggest that the 
manipulation we selected was the more appropriate option.   
The results of Study 3 were also informative in two additional ways. First the results 
converged with Study 1 to suggest that people’s strong default reaction to others’ memory 
failure is to provide a relationship-constructive explanation for the failure (i.e. non-relational 
attributions). Intriguingly, this pattern of explanation occurred even though participants had 
no motivation to preserve the relationships involved. Second, and again consistent with Study 
1, an apparently relationship-constructive pattern of attribution did not fully mitigate the 
impact of memory failure. Although people explained away forgetting in relationship-
constructive ways, forgetting still reduced perceived relationship closeness through 
inferences of importance.  
Study 4 
Study 4 focused on the impact of initial relationship closeness on inferences drawn 
from observing memory or forgetting. In Study 1, we saw no evidence that initial relationship 
closeness moderated the relational impact of being forgotten (path D, Figure 1). Because the 
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base effects of being forgotten in Study 1 were quite small, however, moderate attenuation or 
amplification might plausibly have gone undetected. Study 4 thus re-examined the 
moderating role of initial closeness in a paradigm that was, because of carefully controlled 
stimuli and explicit comparison with remembering, expected to yield larger base differences 
between remembering and forgetting. Such a paradigm was better equipped to detect 
moderate attention or amplification of the base effects of being forgotten or, alternatively, to 
place useful upper limits on the size of plausibly undetected effects.  
In Study 4, we described a relationship between two people with a high, medium, or 
low degree of closeness. Participants then read a scenario in which one person forgot or 
remembered a personal detail about the other. We then assessed participants’ inferences 
about importance and relationship closeness.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
We recruited 303 participants from Prolific Academic. Of these, 17 participants were 
dropped for the following reasons: not completing some or any of the measures (n = 5), 
duplicate submissions (n = 4), and failing an attention check (n = 8). The final sample 
consisted of 286 participants (134 men, 151 women, 1 other). Participants were 34.39 years 
old on average (SD = 11.20). Participants were compensated with £0.5 GBP (approximately 
$0.6 USD).  
This study used a 2 (Memory for personal details: forgotten or remembered) X 3 
(Relationship closeness: low, medium, or high closeness) fully between-subjects design.  
Procedure 
Each participant read one scenario depicting a conversation between two friends. 
Backstory varied the degree of relationship closeness to depict a casual, moderately close, or 
very close relationship. The relevant backstory was constructed based on the characteristics 
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identified by Dibble, Levine, and Park (2012) in their Relationship Closeness Unidimensional 
Scale (i.e., cognitive, affective, and behavioral interdependence). These characteristics 
increased in either frequency or strength with each degree of relationship closeness. We 
manipulated closeness within a single example relationship to isolate closeness from other 
differences between different types of relationships.  
 Next, participants read a conversation in which one person (the communicator) either 
forgot or remembered personal information (a food preference) about the other person (the 
target). We selected personal information as the content of memory because that was the 
most common type of forgotten information in Study 1. After reading the vignette, 
participants rated the importance of the remembered or forgotten information to the 
communicator and how close the communicator was to the target of memory.  
Results 
 Our original hypotheses predicted that initial closeness would moderate the impact of 
inferred importance after forgetting on felt closeness (path D, Figure 1). That is, our original 
hypothesis predicted that initial closeness would moderate the relationship between forgetting 
and felt closeness but not the relationship between forgetting and inferred importance.  
Importance  
Figure 10 presents the mean importance ratings for each memory condition across the 
three levels of relationship closeness. A 2 (memory condition: remembering or forgetting) X 
3 (closeness level: high, medium, or low) between-subjects ANOVA revealed two significant 
effects. A large main effect of memory condition, F(1, 285) = 79.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .22, 95% 
CI[.15, .28], indicated that, as expected, participants rated the target information in the 
vignettes as less important to the communicator when he or she forgot the information (M = 
2.96, SE = .12) than when he or she remembered the information (M = 4.58, SE = .14).  
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A smaller, but still significant, main effect of relationship closeness, F(1, 285) = 4.61, 
p = .011, ηp2 = .03, 95% CI[.00, .05], indicated that target information was perceived as more 
important to the communicator, regardless of memory, in the high closeness condition (M = 
4.14, SE = .16) than in the medium (M = 3.66, SE = .17) or low closeness conditions (M = 
3.51, SE = .14), all ps < .043. The medium and low closeness conditions did not differ from 
one another (p = .482).  
The interaction between memory and initial closeness was not significant, F(1, 285) = 
0.53 p = .589, ηp2 = .00, 95% CI[<-.001, .02]. Moreover, the narrow confidence interval on 
effect size of the interaction between initial closeness and memory indicates that any 
undetected effects would be small.  
Closeness 
Figure 10 presents mean closeness ratings across the three levels of relationship 
closeness. A between-subjects ANOVA revealed two significant effects. A medium-sized 
main effect of memory condition, F(1, 285) = 15.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .05, 95% CI[.02, .10], 
indicated that, as expected, participants rated the communicator as less close to the target 
when he or she forgot the interaction (M = 4.43, SE = .09) than when he or she remembered 
the interaction (M = 4.95, SE = .10). Importantly, this effect was substantially larger than that 
observed in Study 1. 
A large main effect of the closeness manipulation, F(1, 285) = 58.04, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.29, 95% CI[.11, .23], indicated that high closeness relationships (M = 5.45, SE = .12) were 
perceived as closer than medium closeness relationships (M = 4.82, SE = .13) and that 
medium closeness relationships were perceived as closer than low closeness relationships (M 
= 3.80, SE = .10), all ps < .001. 
Finally, as in Study 1, the interaction between memory and initial closeness was not 
significant, F(1, 285) = .264 p = .768, ηp2 = .00, 95% CI[<-.001, .02]. Moreover, the narrow 
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confidence interval on effect size of the interaction between initial closeness and memory 
indicates that any undetected effects of being forgotten would be small.  
These results replicated the consistent effects of memory on closeness across 
relationships of different initial closeness observed in Study 1. Moreover, the more powerful 
design of Study 4 provided narrow confidence intervals on the relevant interaction terms. 
Study 4 thus indicates that any undetected moderating role of initial relationship closeness 
would be small in size.  
Discussion 
These results converge with and expand on Study 1 in two ways. First, they indicate 
that our core model generalizes across a variety of different relationships. Second, they 
indicate that any moderating role of initial relationship closeness is small. Surprisingly, the 
relational impact of being forgotten thus appears best characterized as consistent across 
relationships of different initial closeness.  
General Discussion 
Taken together, the studies reported here provide substantive insight into the 
experience and impact of being forgotten. We have not only described the content, frequency, 
and subjective nature of the experience, we have also tested two systematic accounts of being 
forgotten – our relational model and an ostracism account.  
Description 
Our diary data (Study 1) make clear that the experience of being forgotten is broadly 
relevant in daily life. Being forgotten occurred with great frequency. The context of this study 
(the beginning of a university term) probably contributed to this high frequency, but being 
forgotten was not a rare experience limited to casual and newly formed relationships. Rather, 
participants were forgotten on just as many days as they were not forgotten and this 
forgetting occurred across both casual relationships (e.g., classmates and acquaintances) and 
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close relationships (e.g., friends and family members). Similarly, it was not the case that 
being forgotten primarily involved failing to recognize another person. Rather, most 
experiences of being forgotten involved failures to recall a personal detail or a past 
interaction. Overall, these data provide a first picture of what the experience of being 
forgotten looks like in daily life and suggest that the experience of being forgotten is an 
integral part of human relationships rather than a rare curiosity.  
The Relational Model 
The core of our model is the proposition that being forgotten elicits inferences of 
importance (path A, Figure 1) and, in turn, affects relationship closeness (path B, Figure 1). 
Both elements of this proposition received unambiguous support across studies. In diary data 
(Study 1), participants who had been forgotten reported feeling less important to the person 
who forgot them and to others in general, as well as less close to the person who forgot them 
and to others in general. Parallel outcomes emerged in a constructed firsthand experience of 
being forgotten (Study 2) and in observers’ inferences after witnessing someone else being 
forgotten (Studies 3 and 4). The core pathway between being forgotten, inferring reduced 
importance, and reducing relationship closeness thus appears well supported. 
Attribution (path C, Figure 1). Attributional explanations for forgetting appear to be 
a key moderator of the link between being forgotten and inferred importance. In our diary 
data (Study 1), participants who explained being forgotten through situational (e.g., she was 
busy) or dispositional (e.g. he just has a poor memory) factors inferred more importance and 
felt closer to the person who forgot them that did participants who explained being forgotten 
through relational factors (e.g., she isn’t invested). A similar pattern emerged in our scenario 
data (Study 3) for both importance and closeness, although the key comparisons reached 
significance only for importance. 
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Just as importantly, our exploration of attribution revealed two unexpected pieces of 
information. First, people appear to have a strong pro-relationship default when explaining 
memory errors. In both the diary data (Study 1) and in reaction to observed incidents of 
forgetting (Study 3), participants’ strong tendency was to explain forgetting through 
situational or dispositional factors rather than through relational factors. Second, in both of 
these studies, non-relational attributions were not sufficient to eliminate the relational damage 
caused by forgetting. Despite explaining away forgetting in non-relational ways, participants 
still inferred less importance and felt less close. It thus appears that people usually minimize 
the negative implications of the experience of being forgotten through mitigating attributions, 
but this effort is usually only partially successful.  
This pattern of explanation might suggest that people view forgetting as accidental by 
default. That is, in most circumstances people assume that others will remember information 
if they are capable of it. Explanation of memory errors through dispositional and situational 
factors might thus reflect what Malle dubbed enabling factors explanations (Malle, 2004; see 
also supporting factors explanations in Heider, 1958). Enabling factors explanations assume 
that successful action reflects specific intentions and focus on supporting elements for that 
action to explain failure. In our findings, a lack of situational distractions and a generally 
capable memory would thus be enabling factors for successful memory. In the case of 
remembering, these factors would not receive attention and the action would be attributed to 
the driving motive of relational investment. In the case of forgetting, attention would be 
directed to the factors required to enable successful remembering before revisiting the 
assumed relational investment. That is, if either of situational distraction or chronically poor 
memory could adequately explain memory failure, the underlying intention to remember 
would not be questioned.   
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The persistent relational damage that we observed despite mitigating attributions 
would in turn be consistent with the so-called fundamental attribution error (Jones & Davis, 
1965; Kelley, 1973). In the fundamental attribution error, obvious situational explanations for 
behavior are not given sufficient weight in the explanation of that behavior. Treatments of 
this error suggest that intentions are initially inferred from actions quickly and automatically, 
but are then revised in light of mitigating factors (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Gilbert & 
Osborne, 1989). In our data, an enabling factors orientation would lead people to prefer 
mitigating explanations over relational explanations, but those mitigating explanations would 
not fully overrule automatic inferences about the forgetting agent’s investment in the 
relationship.  
One question that remains unanswered in these explanations is why people would 
assume that forgetting is accidental. The most obvious explanation to us is that forgetting 
carries a relational cost for the forgetter. That is, people assume that forgetting is accidental 
because there is no advantage to forgetting others. An additional possibility is that assuming 
that forgetting is accidental might be self-protective. That is, assuming that people intended 
to remember you supports a generally positive view of the self and one’s social integration. 
Finally, forgetting might be so embedded in routine social interaction that explanations for it 
are dictated by normative scripts. That is, ready-made explanations for other people’s 
memory failures might be stored in memory rather than generated online. Critically, these 
different explanations are testable through manipulation of relevant motives or expectations 
respectively.  
Initial closeness (path D, Figure 1). Our core relational model appears to apply well 
across relationship types. Both the diary data (Study 1) and our scenarios depicting forgetting 
(Study 4) examined the interpersonal implications of forgetting another person across a 
variety of relationships. The core links between forgetting, inferred importance, and closeness 
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applied across relationships of different initial closeness. The links described in our core 
model also appeared consistent in their magnitude. Although we had expected that the link 
between forgetting and closeness would be exaggerated in closer relationships (Path D, 
Figure 1), we observed no evidence of such moderation in diary data (Study 1) or in third 
party observations of forgetting (Study 3).  
This finding is surprising in light of the greater importance of closer relationships to 
human belongingness needs (Fuhrman et al., 2009) and also runs contrary to the intuition of 
most researchers with whom we have discussed this work. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that initial relationship closeness might become relevant when considering outcome 
variables not yet included in our model of being forgotten or remembered. For example, 
coping strategies and behavioral reactions would plausibly differ after similar memory 
failures on the part of a close friend and on the part of a causal acquaintance. 
Overall, our original relational model of being forgotten (Figure 1) was quite 
successful in explaining the experience of being forgotten. The core of the model (Paths A 
and B) was unambiguously supported and our first specified moderator, attribution, affected 
the predicted link between forgetting and inferred importance (path C). Our second predicted 
moderator, initial relationship closeness (path D), did not appear to moderate the link 
between importance and closeness, however.  
The Ostracism Hypothesis 
We also tested an alternative, although not mutually exclusive, account of being 
forgotten – parallels with ostracism. This account posits that being forgotten might be similar 
to the experience of being ostracized in its effects on intrapersonal needs (i.e., self-esteem, 
control, and meaningfulness). We observed moderate support for this account. In our diary 
data (Study 1), being forgotten negatively affected an aggregate measure of intrapersonal 
needs, although inferential tests of the individual components (self-esteem, felt control, and 
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meaningfulness) were mixed in statistical significance. In a controlled firsthand experience 
(Study 2), being forgotten marginally affected participants felt meaning in life but did not 
impact search for meaning or self-esteem. Overall, these results suggest that parallels 
between being forgotten and ostracism hold.  
In the experiences we studied relational outcomes were more obviously and 
dramatically impacted than were strictly intrapersonal outcomes. Why might this be? One 
possible explanation is the normative nature of the events under study here. The experiences 
we examined were generally unremarkable minor events that occurred as part of an ongoing 
and generally positive interaction. In contrast, ostracism (and exclusion more broadly) 
usually involves non-normative signals that terminate an interaction (Williams, 2007). 
Critically, normative experiences of exclusion do not threaten intrapersonal needs as severely 
as non-normative experiences of exclusion (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016). More comparable 
relational and intrapersonal effects might thus emerge in non-normative experiences of being 
forgotten.  
Alternatively, the impact of being forgotten on intrapersonal needs might depend on 
the extent of forgetting. Completely forgetting a person, even after prompting, would be hard 
to distinguish from oblivious ostracism (i.e., failing to recognize, acknowledge, or think 
about a person at all). Oblivious ostracism does indeed create reliable threats to intrapersonal 
needs (Nezlek, Wesselmann, Wheeler, & Williams, 2012; Sommer, Williams, Ciarocco, & 
Baumeister, 2001; Williams, 1997). 
Finally, differences in the perceived intentionality of forgetting and ostracism could 
also lead to discrepant effects on intrapersonal needs. Ostracism and social exclusion 
generally entail intentional deprivation of social connection. In contrast, being forgotten 
represents a more ambiguous social event. For instance, forgetting could plausibly be 
perceived as the unintended outcome of an attempt to remember. Indeed, as discussed 
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previously, such interpretation would be consistent with the high frequency of mitigating 
attributional explanations that we observed in Studies 1 and 3. Moreover, in the ostracism 
literature, an understanding of the reasons for being ostracized reduces threat to 
belongingness and self-esteem (Sommer et al., 2001). In this sense, being forgotten might not 
imply loss of or failure to attain social connection to the same degree as ostracism and 
rejection.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Both a strength and a limitation of the present work is that it raises more questions 
than we could possibly hope to answer in a single report of research. Even the rich data from 
Study 1 can speak to more questions than we address here. We have, however, limited our 
focus to questions for which we can provide convergent evidence across multiple studies. In 
the numerous cases where we cannot yet provide such convergent evidence, the present work 
lays a foundation for future lines of enquiry.  
One such question concerns the role of information type in reactions to being 
forgotten. Some information may be viewed as more acceptable (or even desirable) to forget 
than other information. For example, people may be unbothered if others forget an 
inconsequential detail they mentioned in passing or may even prefer that others forget their 
embarrassing faux pas at the office holiday party. In these instances, forgetting may have a 
less negative, or even positive, impact on social relationships. Systematically exploring the 
importance of information type in the experience of being forgotten thus presents an 
important avenue for future research.   
Our findings cast new light on people’s tendency to confuse or forget members of 
other races and social groups (Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010; Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001; Ray & Matschke, 2012; Sporer, 2001; Taylor, Fiske, & Etcoff, 1978). 
Although memory bias against people of other races and social groups is well-documented, 
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the direct interpersonal consequences of such bias have not been well defined. Our findings 
suggest that these memory errors may disrupt the development of friendships between 
members of different ethnic and social groups, which may in turn perpetuate 
misunderstandings, stereotyping, and prejudice (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 
1997). This source of intergroup strife is especially important to recognize as memory bias is 
often orthogonal to prejudiced attitudes (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Interventions designed 
to reduce prejudice will thus not be effective in addressing antagonism arising from the 
involuntary signals sent through memory errors.  
The consequences of forgetting over time present an additional important question. 
On one hand, the impact of a single small incident of forgetting might fade quite quickly. On 
the other hand, a pattern of forgetting might create a downward spiral in which forgetting 
undermines investment in a relationship and decreased investment leads to reciprocal 
forgetting. The study of forgetting and remembering in long-term ongoing relationships 
would provide invaluable insight into the long-term consequences of relational memory and 
forgetting.  
Summary and Conclusion 
Being forgotten is a relatively common experience that occurs within a variety of 
different relationship types and most commonly involves personal details or past interactions. 
Being forgotten affects interpersonal relationships because it leads to inferences of subjective 
importance to the forgetter that in turn impact relationship closeness. This process appears to 
apply with surprising uniformity across relationships of different initial closeness. Non-
relational explanations for forgetting (e.g., she was distracted) are strongly preferred to 
relational explanations for being forgotten (e.g., she isn’t interested) and reduce the impact of 
forgetting. This reduction is incomplete, however; being forgotten has relational implications 
even when explained in non-relational ways. Being forgotten also appears to have a parallel, 
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although less extreme, impact on intrapersonal needs. In the same way as ostracisms and 
rejection, being forgotten appears to affects felt meaning in life and probably also affects felt 
control and self-esteem.  
These insights provide scientific description of a human universal – the experience of 
being forgotten. These findings are especially important because memory is a favorite 
outcome of study in psychological science. The present work thus illuminates the 
interpersonal implications of any research that examines memory for humans or human 
activity as an outcome variable.  
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Figure 1. Theoretical model of the psychological impact of being remembered or forgotten. 
Evidence of memory supports inferences about subjective importance (Path A) that in turn 
have relational implications (Path B), including changes in relationship closeness and 
commitment. Inferences of importance depend on attributional explanations for forgetting 
(Path C) and the implications of inferred importance depend on the initial closeness of the 
relationship involved (Path D). All paths in the model were well supported except Path D.  
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Figure 2. Results of Study 1. Percentage of incidents by type of information forgotten. 
Personal details and past interactions were by far the most commonly forgotten type of 
information.  
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Figure 3. Results of Study 1. Percentage of incidents forgotten by different relationship 
partners. Forgetting occurred fairly uniformly across different relationships, but with reduced 
frequency among romantic partners and family members.   
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Figure 4. Type of information forgotten broken down by type of relationship involved. Forgetting of personal details and failures of recognition 
appeared more often in less close relationships whereas forgetting of past interactions and promises appeared more often in closer relationships.  
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Figure 5. Mean difference between days when participants were not forgotten and days when 
participants were forgotten for daily mood (positive and negative), relational outcomes 
(importance and belonging) and intrapersonal outcomes (self-esteem, meaning in life, 
perceived control). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals (note that error bars in later 
figures present standard errors). Being forgotten more strongly impacted relational outcomes 
than intrapersonal outcomes.  
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Figure 6. Results of Study 1. Percentage of attributions endorsed as explanations for incidents of 
being forgotten in Study 1. Being forgotten was more often explained through non-relational 
(dark grey bars) than relational (light grey bars) attributions.  
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Figure 7. Results of Study 2. Changes in participants’ mean rating of importance to the 
confederate, liking of the confederate, and self-other overlap with the confederate after being 
remembered or forgotten by the confederate. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
Being forgotten reduced importance, liking, and self-other overlap whereas being remembered 
had little to no effect.  
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Figure 8. Results of Study 3. Frequency of attributions made after reading a scenario that 
depicted remembering or forgetting paired with different attributional information. The 
manipulations generally determined the attributional explanation participants endorsed. 
Forgetting was by default attributed to mitigating (dispositional or situational) factors, even 
when no attribution information was presented and, surprisingly, even when participants were 
encouraged to endorse relational explanations.   
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Figure 9. Results of Study 3. Inferred importance of past interaction to communicator (panel A) 
and target’s inferred closeness to communicator (panel B) after reading a scenario that depicted 
remembering or forgetting paired with different attributional information. Error bars represent 
cell standard errors. Non-relational attributions did not fully mitigate the impact of forgetting on 
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either outcome, but did reduce the damage caused by relational explanations of forgetting to 
importance and, more ambiguously, to closeness.  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Results of Study 4. Inferred importance of past interaction to communicator (panel A) 
and communicator’s inferred closeness to target (panel B) after reading a scenario that depicted 
remembering or forgetting across three levels of relationship closeness. Error bars represent cell 
standard errors. Evidence of memory led to more inferred importance and closeness than did 
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evidence of forgetting across different levels of initial relationship closeness. Initial relationship 
closeness did not moderate outcomes.  
